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Background
The EU-Africa Summit on migration and an informal council meeting took place in the
Maltese capital Valletta on the 11 and 12 November 2015.1 The decision to call the
meetings was taken by Donald Tusk on 20 April 2015 in response to the worsening
migrant tragedies in the central Mediterranean region, a day after a fishing boat full of
migrants capsized some 96 kilometres off the Libyan coast leading to the loss of about
800 lives in what became the biggest migrant boat tragedy ever. The need to strengthen
cooperation with third countries was paramount. The EU-Africa Summit was attended by
EU and African leaders, the Presidents of the European Council, the Commission and
the European Parliament as well as high officials from the United Nations and some of its
agencies, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, the Arab
League and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie. The EU “Emergency
Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced
persons in Africa” (hereafter, “The Emergency Trust Fund for Africa” [EUTF]) was set up
during the summit. A fortnight later a Commonwealth heads of state and government also
met in Valletta between the 27 and 29 November and migration again featured
prominently. 
Rationale of this Policy Brief
This policy brief does not attempt a comprehensive assessment of the EUTF. It focuses
more on its main objectives and mechanisms, the principal issues which underscored the
Valletta EU-Africa Summit, the cleavage between the EU and its African partners over
migration and the scope of the EUTF. Laura Hammond in an advert in Newsweek stated
that it cannot be assumed that development aid given to recipient countries (through
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government and civil society channels) will directly and immediately improve the lives of
would-be migrants and their families; the EU cannot assume that all migration to Europe
has economic roots; and, thirdly, that while the Fund claims to address the root causes
of movement, a major focus is to pave the way for countries of origin to accept
deportations (returnees) (Hammond, 2015). In a nutshell, Hammond’s observation
gathers together the main points made in this brief. 
From a human rights’ perspective, the EU’s handling of migration has been questioned
on several points. One issue that divided leaders at the Valletta Summit was whether
what are termed as irregular migrants should be deported to their countries or not. African
leaders stressed that the return of migrants must be on a voluntary basis while the EU
side insisted that all “economic” migrants who entered the EU irregularly should be
returned (Nielsen, 2015). Defining what or who is an “economic” migrant is a complex
issue worth separate treatment.
A few other hypotheses and assumptions are assessed in this brief in the light of the
EUTF. In general it is assumed that while the EUTF may have a positive effect on the
countries and the regions for which it is intended, it is not the silver bullet that will resolve
the migration problem. In addition, it does not shift financial resources to where they are
lacking. Developing countries already benefit from huge financial flows by way of migrants’
remittances and Official Development Aid (ODA) which by far outstrip the aid provided
under the Trust Fund – and indeed ODA itself. Adding a little more to this flow will not
really make a difference except of course at the micro level where projects financed by
the Fund are successful. The EU’s motive for tying development aid and migration is
another way of trying to condition third countries to behave in a specific way favoured by
the EU. But sovereign states may choose not to do as they are told once they calculate
the cost and benefits of compliance. Lastly, by linking development and migration the EU
is conflating two phenomena that raise significant political and legal questions while the
final outcome might indeed turn out to be very different from the expected ones. The
aphorism “the road to hell is paved with good intentions” holds in this case.
A Shifting Situation
By the time of the Valletta Summit, the problem of irregular migration had shifted from the
central to the eastern Mediterranean, and the main concern was no longer exclusively with
African migrants, but with the much bigger waves of Syrian, and to a lesser degree Afghani
and Iraqi, citizens fleeing across Turkey into Greece and from there on to the Balkans and
Hungary and onwards to the rest of the EU. The Balkan route was obviously the least expensive
and least dangerous, but at the same time the shift illustrates the extremely dynamic and volatile
nature of contemporary migration. It also divided the EU, wobbled the Schengen Agreement
and eroded internal solidarity. However, it needs to be stressed that the growing importance
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of the Syrian refugee challenge does not lessen the significance of African migration from the
Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa.2 In 2014, no less than a fifth of asylum seekers in the EU hailed
from 18 African countries located in the Sahel, Lake Chad and the Horn of Africa regions
covered by the EUTF. In addition to these countries, the Fund also covers five North African
states, namely Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, long-standing EU partners in the
Mediterranean Neighbourhood. Figures on first time asylum applications in the EU released
by EUROSTAT show a sharp increase in the number of applications for protection from Syria,
Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly in the second and third quarters of 2015 but migratory
pressures from the countries of sub-Saharan Africa are also on the rise. Taking the levels of
asylum applications in the EU-28 as a rough guide to migratory trends, applicants from seven
sub-Saharan countries covered by the EUTF registered a significant increase of just under
10% in the first three quarters of 2015 compared to the same period in 2014.3
The Objectives of the Trust Fund
The setting up of the EUTF is the most tangible result of the Valletta EU-Africa Summit. The
EUTF was accompanied by an Action Plan based on five main objectives intended to back
the political decisions taken by concrete action. These objectives include tackling the root
causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; the enhancement of legal migration
and regular channels of mobility including short-term mobility for students, researchers and
entrepreneurs between Africa and Europe; protection and asylum, upholding human rights
of all migrants; the fight against irregular migration; and the return, readmission and
integration of irregular migrants (European Council, 2015a). 
These objectives are not completely new in the sense that they already form part of previous EU
political declarations and policy initiatives. They are in line with the EU’s approach to migration.
Under the external dimension of the Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) and
its predecessor the Common Agenda on Migration (CAM), the EU has been trying since 2005
to deal with the migration challenge in a comprehensive manner. However, the success of the
different actions carried out within the various pillars of the CAMM varies considerably. Internal
policies tend to receive more funding from the EU budget than external ones.4
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2 The countries involved are: Sahel-Lake Chad region – Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, the Gambia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal; the Horn of Africa – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan,
Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.
3 The countries analysed are Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Gambia, Senegal and Mali – all part of the group
falling under the EUTF. The data analysed is provided by Eurostat in “Asylum Statistics” at http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics visited on 20.01.2016 and Table 2 in Eurostat Data in
Focus, 3/2015 “Asylum Applicants and First Instance Decisions on Asylum Applications: 2014” published in 2015.
There are some discrepancies in the data sets published in the two publications and the information was used for
the purpose of identifying trends in migratory flows.
4  For a comprehensive treatment of these stands, see European Parliament (2015). EU Co-operation with Third
Countries in the Field of migration., Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights
and Constitutional Affairs. Study prepared for the LIBE Committee at http://www.europarl.europa.eu
/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/536469/IPOL_STU%282015%29536469_EN.pdf
Spurring On Development
The Valletta Action Plan aims to strengthen measures to spur on development and poverty
eradication in the countries of Africa from where the migrants arriving in Europe originate
by mainstreaming migration in development cooperation to boost economic and social
development, particularly by creating jobs for young women and men; strengthening the
resilience of communities hosting long stay or protracted refugee communities; enhancing
sustainable livelihoods and self-reliance opportunities; developing the benefits of
migration; promoting cheaper, safer, legally-compliant and faster transfers of remittances;
engaging diasporas in countries of origin; preventing, mitigating and resolving conflicts,
combating human rights violations and abuses that generate internal displacement,
irregular migration and refugee flows. 
At the Valletta Summit, the EU’s keenness on the return and readmission of migrants was
very clear. The EU’s insistence on return and readmission, included as a central pillar of
the EUTF, concurs with Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement which requires that “at the
request of a Party, negotiations shall be initiated with ACP States aiming at concluding
in good faith and with due regard for the relevant rules of international law, bilateral
agreements governing specific obligations for the readmission and return of their
nationals” (European Commission, 2014). Article 13 was overhauled soon after the
Lisbon Treaty came into force in line with the EU’s deepening concerns on migration. 
The absolute majority of African leaders opposed it and only reluctantly accepted it in
the end. They criticised Europe with double standards for welcoming Syrian refugees in
large numbers while trying to discourage African ones. Senegal’s President Macky Sall
speaking on behalf of African leaders made another point by stressing that Africa would
not need any financial aid if Europe cooperated with it in stamping out tax evasion by
multi-nationals and other fraudulent activities estimated to amount to €60 billion.5
The Senegalese President could have also referred to the size of migrants’ remittances
flowing to Africa. According to a World Bank report, in 2015 an estimated $432 billion
were sent to the developing countries by migrants in the developed world, of which $35
billion went to sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2016). This figure excludes flows that
arrived in this region through informal networks as well as what can be termed as non-
monetary remittances. So important are remittances to the southern African countries




5 This was reported by several news media outlets during the summit but see Laing, A. (2015, November 13).
African Leaders Reject EU ‘Charity’ Over ‘Investment’. The Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/11993920/African-leaders-reject-EU-charity-over-
investment.htm
Remittances excogitate a lot of debate and often contrasting views. According to Dilip
Ratha, remittances are not squandered on consumption but are positively correlated to
increased investment by remittance-receiving households in education and health,
besides increasing their incomes and helping them to overcome poverty (Ratha, 2013).
However, three issues need to be kept in focus to avoid overstating their beneficial
effects: the “brain drain”, the “silent back wash” of financial flows in the opposite direction
and the problem of whether the receiving country has the structures and policies in place
to ensure their maximum utilisation (Castles & Miller, 2009, pp.61-62).
Development-Migration Nexus
There are sufficiently strong arguments, which the author concurs with, that immigration
is one of the ways by which the EU can address adverse demographic changes and
aging population. However, there is another streak to the migration literature which
requires attention, namely whether economic development actually reduces migratory
pressures or not. Studies by Massey (1988) and de Haas (2007) have often been quoted
to suggest the contrary (Clemens, 2014). The puzzle has not been completely resolved
and it is further complicated by the fact that the decision to migrate may be influenced by
a number of factors in combination with each other, and not one. The issue is crucial to
the eventual success of the EUTF.
Migration is regulated by a number of UN conventions, whose ratification by states
remains uneven, however. The EU and its member states are obliged to respect them
but over the years EU migration policy has become progressively defensive and
restrictive even though the Union has started to pursue more formal and legal forms
of entry with several countries. The EU’s agreements with third countries, such as
those enshrined in the objectives of the EUTF, raise a plethora of concerns on
migrants’ human rights and questions about their legality. There is near universal
agreement that the benefits of migration are better realised in a context where
migrants’ human rights are fully protected. A much more “open” EU immigration policy
may be more reasonable but politically unacceptable in the present context given
member states’ objections. Development touches upon migration but it has its own
rationale and dynamics. Conflating the two will certainly denature both by deflecting
them from their proper objectives.
Resources
The EUTF was created to permit the pooling of financial resources from different donors
and to enable a swift response to the changing demands of emergency situations. The
constitutive document setting up the EUTF was signed by Spain and the European
Commission during the Valletta Summit (European Commission, 2015a). 
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The EUTF’s legal basis is the New Financial Regulation (NFR), which came into effect
on 1 January 2013 (European Commission, 2012a).6 The main aims of the NFR and its
Rules of Application (RAP) are simplification, speedier procedures, accountability and
facilitation of leverage on EU funds by third party financial outlays. By the end of 2015,
three trust funds had been set up on the basis of the NFR: the Bêkou EU Trust Fund, the
Madad Fund and Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Briefly, the Bêkou Fund, established
in 2014, provides humanitarian aid to the Central African Republic and is estimated to
reach a total of €108 million; the Madad Fund was also created in 2014 in response to
the growing Syrian refugee problem and was projected to achieve a budget of €543
million and eventually €1 billion. 
The various projects outlined in the Action Plan accompanying the EUTF are most likely
to begin to be felt in the long term. They seem to require more resources than those
currently available under the EUTF considering that the fund has at its disposal only half
(i.e. €1.8 billion) of the projected €3.6 million that the Commission wishes it to attain
eventually. Speaking during the Valletta Summit, Commission President Jean-Claude
Juncker said, “For the Africa trust fund and our response to be credible, I want to see
more member states contributing and matching the €1.8bn the EU has put forward”
(Louch, 2015). It is clear that a high premium is being attached to “money” as a crucial
response to controlling migration. But it goes without saying that projects need to be
carefully chosen to ensure maximum effectiveness. This in turn depends on what
motivates their choice, whether it is the need to stop migrants from moving to Europe or
to promote sustainable development (Herrero Cangas & Knoll, 2016). Then there is the
further question of what the effect of economic development is likely to be on migratory
flows.
In February 2016, the Commission published a “performance monitoring system” (PMS)
to assess the effects of the EUTF actions by linking the EUTF’s objectives with verifiable,
empirical indicators to show whether the actions are having the desired effect or not.7
The PMS will be refined progressively as the projects unfold. The crucially important
assessment data will have to come from the information and reports generated by the
programmes themselves. 
Twenty-five EU member states and two non-EU states, Switzerland and Norway, have
pledged €81.3 million (see table in the Annex) while the rest consist of transfers from
already existing funds, namely fresh funding from the 11th European Development Fund
reserve, the integration of funds from the Regional Indicative Programmes for East, West
and Central Africa as well as the Horn of Africa, and contributions from the European
6 See in particular Article 187, p. 77.
7 The PMS can be accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eu-emergency-trust-fund-re-
sults-framework-25042016_en.pdf
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and the Development Co-operation Instrument. More
contributions could be made in the future by the EU member states as well as non-EU
member states. According to the EU, the EUTF is additional to and complements the
estimated €20 billion a year in ODA already provided by the EU and its member states
(European Commission, 2015d).
The reluctance of the member states to fork out more financial resources to the fund can be
explained by several reasons, not least among them the economic recession that has gripped
the Eurozone since 2009. However, it is also congruent to another well-commented
observation on EU development aid, namely that in 2015 nearly all the member states missed
the target of raising their development aid to 0.7% of GNI, a pledge which they solemnly
made in 2005 and have renewed practically every year since. Only Denmark, Luxembourg,
Sweden and the UK surpassed the threshold (Bacian, 2015). Commission and member
state estimates indicate that EU ODA was likely to hit 0.44% of GNI in 2015, approximately
€38.58 billion below the 0.7 target (Council of the European Union, 2015). In sum, most of
the EU member states clearly do not think that they can or should do more to address the
lack of development in the regions outside Europe.
A further sign of the constraints being felt is that member states have also been designating
as ODA a growing share of funds that are not really transferred to developing countries.
These include administrative costs, expenditure on maintaining migrant communities in the
donor/host countries and debt relief to developing countries, all of which amount to about a
fifth of ODA according to the OECD. For this reason, more emphasis is being placed on
Country Programmable Aid (CPA) and on aid effectiveness. 
There is also a normative issue which is relevant in the context of EUTF, whether such aid
should be counted as ODA or not. EurActiv, quoted Sara Tesorieri, Oxfam’s migration policy
lead in Malta, with saying, “The EU Trust Fund for Africa must have a clear separation
between development aid and security cooperation envelopes ― these have different
objectives and do not belong in the same pot” (Crisp, 2015). According to this view, there
is a clear risk that ODA will be diverted from alleviating poverty to trying to hold migrants in
their own countries. Additionally, when making or increasing their contributions to the EUTF,
member states may begin to count this as part of their ODA. However, it needs to be
stressed that one of the key EUTF objectives is to foster development. The constitutive
document of the fund states clearly that the EUTF is established under the European
Development Fund (EDF). While not denying that action under the EUTF can be clearly
designated as “development”, the expectations were that it would mobilise additional funds
to the ones already allocated under existing aid instruments.
The EU member states that have donated less than €3 million are excluded from the
fund’s Strategic Board and its operational Committee, both of which are chaired by the
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Commission. They have argued that they are losing decision-making control over the
€1.8 billion outlay from the EU budget. 
Actions Announced so Far
On 16 December 2015, the European Commission announced 16 actions of almost
€300 million falling within the objectives identified by the Valletta Summit, including 10
worth €253 million in the Horn of Africa approved during the first Operational Committee
meeting of the EUTF (European Commission, 2015e). Two days later, the first EUTF
project worth €20 million was signed with Italy in Brussels for implementation in Ethiopia
(European Commission, 2015f). It is worth recalling in this context that on 11 November
2015, on the fringes of the Valletta Summit, the EU and Ethiopia signed a declaration on
a Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (European Commission, 2015e). On 14
January 2016, the European Commission announced 10 measures for the Sahel region
for an outlay of €100 million (European Commission, 2016a; European Commission,
2016b). The Commission was eager to show some acumen and momentum on the
implementation of the Valletta Summit conclusions and to a large extent it succeeded in
doing so. On 18 April 2016, twenty new measures were adopted8 to assist the Sahel
region and Lake Chad Basin, worth over €280 million (European Commission, 2016c).
Ten days later, the Operational Committee adopted another 10 actions for the Horn of
Africa complementing those approved on 16 December 2015 and amounting to €253
million (European Commission, 2016d). In June 2016, the Operational Committee also
adopted a package worth €27.5 million as part of the ‘North of Africa Window’ (Algeria,
Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia). Country projects for Libya and Egypt were adopted
with the aim of strengthening the resilience of displaced populations in these countries.
A regional project covering the countries of the window was also adopted (European
Commission, 2016e; European Commission, 2016f).
Conclusion
The EUTF as an instrument for the mobilisation of funds for development is a positive
initiative in theory until a thorough assessment is possible to check the results of the many
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8 Regional Development and Protection Programmes (€60 million) in Ethiopia (€30 million), Sudan (€15
million) and Kenya (€15 million) to improve the living conditions of Eritrean and Somali refugees and other
refugee groups and their host communities; legal migration and mobility (€10 million) to improve existing
avenues for legal migration and mobility between the countries of the region; capacity-building to the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development IGAD (€5 million) to enable it to promote resilience by building
its capacity to implement its regional resilience strategy; and National actions: promoting a culture of tolerance
and dialogue in Somalia (€5 million); creation of economic opportunities in Kenya (€12 million); implementation
of the Special Measure for Sudan (€25 million); two measures for East Sudan (€12 million) and West Darfur
(€7 million) to strengthen community resilience, social cohesion and peacebuilding in areas affected by flows
of returnees from Chad and internal displacement; an action for East Sudan and the Transitional Area of Blue
Nile (€6 million) to improve the capacity of central and local authorities to collect, analyse and disseminate
data and evidence on food security.
projects promoted by it against the declared expectations articulated by the Valletta
Summit Declaration and incorporated into the Action Plan. The Plan was designed to
provide substance to the policy objectives outlined in the Valletta Declaration. 
At the same time, it has to be kept in mind that the motivation to migrate results from
many different factors and the uprooting of people by ongoing, endemic conflicts and
lack of development, social dislocation, environmental degradation and the negative
effects of climate change cannot be easily resolved as the history of the regions involved
has demonstrated. This also applies to the need to combat corruption, which stalls
development. On the basis of a 2002 African Union study, corruption was estimated to
cost the continent around $150 billion a year. According to Transparency International,
Africa is home to half of the 30 most corrupt governments in the world. 
The size of the African development challenge and the resources needed to make any
serious inroads into it contrast sharply with the meagre resources offered by the EUTF,
which in any case was never intended to take on the burden alone but to provide
additional funding and leverage. At the same time and paradoxically, lack of finance for
development does not seem to be a problem considering ODA and remittances (through
formal and informal networks) which reach sub-Saharan Africa. A follow up of the Valletta
Summit is due in 2017, when hopefully the first preliminary evidence of the impact of the
fund will become known.
Improved border management, one of the main European objectives behind the political
rhetoric, depends on the readiness of the African partners to work with the EU in
implementing effective return, readmission and reintegration of irregular migrants not
qualifying for protection in Europe and to cooperate fully with the EU in combating human
trafficking and smuggling. This in turn depends on the African countries’ readiness to
cooperate with the EU by providing travel documentation to facilitate returnees. Hence
one of the main objectives of the Valletta Summit was to secure such compliance. This
issue caused quite a stir in EU-Africa diplomatic exchanges, both in the run-up to and
during the summit itself. There is also another related issue that is of relevance to transit
countries, particularly the Mediterranean Basin countries, regarding the EU’s insistence
that they too should accept returnees from third countries who passed through their
territories. These sovereign countries, former colonies which abhor even the faintest sign
of external interference, may prove too much for the EU to handle.
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